Packaging & Release¶

How talkrypt is built, packaged, hashed, and verified for every platform. Full detail: docs/PACKAGING.md, docs/packaging-policy.md. Scripts: scripts/.

One command¶

bash scripts/release.sh            # desktop + mobile, then one unified set of checksums
bash dist/verify.sh dist           # verify everything (bash)
pwsh  dist/verify.ps1 -Dir dist    # verify everything (PowerShell)

release.sh runs the desktop and mobile packagers and then hashes the whole dist/. Each step records (never hides) any target it can't build on the current host.

Scripts¶

Script	Builds
`scripts/package.sh`	Desktop: macOS `.dmg`+`.tar.gz`, Linux `.tar.gz`+`.deb`, Windows `.zip`
`scripts/package-mobile.sh`	Android `.apk` (+ iOS `.xcframework` on a Mac with Xcode)
`scripts/build-ios.sh`	iOS XCFramework + Swift bindings; `--testflight` to archive + upload
`scripts/hash-dist.sh`	SHA-256 and SHA3-256 over all of `dist/` + the verifiers
`scripts/build-portable.sh`	Bare self-contained per-target `talkrypt` binaries

Artifacts¶

Platform	Artifact
macOS	`talkrypt-<v>-macos.dmg` (universal) + per-arch `.tar.gz`
Linux glibc	`…-{x86_64,aarch64}-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz` + `talkrypt_<v>_{amd64,arm64}.deb`
Linux static (musl)	`…-…-linux-musl.tar.gz` + `talkrypt-static_<v>_{amd64,arm64}.deb`
Windows	`talkrypt-<v>-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu.zip`
Android	`talkrypt-<v>-android-arm64.apk`
iOS	`talkrypt-<v>-ios-xcframework.zip` (on a Mac with Xcode)

The glibc .deb is the package talkrypt; the fully-static musl .deb is talkrypt-static (it Conflicts/Provides talkrypt, so install one). Linux targets cross-compile via cross (Docker).

Dual-family integrity (SHA-256 + SHA3-256)¶

Every release ships two independent checksum files — SHA256SUMS (SHA-256, FIPS 180-4, Merkle–Damgård) and SHA3-256SUMS (SHA3-256, FIPS 202, Keccak sponge). Both must match for every file: the families are structurally unrelated, so a cryptanalytic break or deliberate collision in one cannot also satisfy the other.

verify.sh (bash) and verify.ps1 (PowerShell) check both, print OK/FAIL per file, and exit non-zero on any mismatch. They auto-detect a SHA3 backend (openssl 3.x / python3 / rhash, or .NET 8's SHA3_256 on Windows) and fall back gracefully. MANIFEST.txt lists sizes, both digests, and every skipped target with the reason (e.g. "no Xcode → iOS skipped"), never a silent omission.

Signing (the honest gap)¶

There is no trusted code-signing authority: macOS bundles are ad-hoc signed (Gatekeeper still warns), the .debs and the APK are not authority-signed, nothing is notarized. Integrity rests on the dual checksums and on building from source (SECURITY-AUDIT.md F-8).

Packaging political filter¶

Distributing the source is unconditional (Apache-2.0, builds everywhere). Endorsing a downstream channel (a distro repo, a tap, a store) is gated by docs/packaging-policy.md: a Tier-1 channel's host must have publicly committed to never implement government-mandated age-verification or identity-attestation. The gate is about endorsement, not access — anyone may build and run talkrypt.