talkrypt wiki

talkrypt is a minimalist, IRC-like, post-quantum, end-to-end-encrypted, forward-secret chat that runs over Tor. The cryptography is pure-Rust (RustCrypto) and PQ by default — ML-KEM-1024 for key establishment, ML-DSA-87 for identity, AES-256-GCM for content — aligned with NSA CNSA 2.0. There is no elliptic-curve identity key; the only EC anywhere is an optional, non-load-bearing X25519 hybrid half (defense-in-depth).

This wiki is the feature map. Each page links to the authoritative spec in docs/ for the deep detail.

Honesty first. talkrypt is experimental, pre-release software. It is NOT independently audited, NOT FIPS-validated, NOT CSfC-accredited, NOT NSA-approved, and NOT authorized for classified use. It implements the CNSA 2.0 algorithms; that is not the same as certification. See Security Assurance and SECURITY.md.

Start here

• Getting Started — install, host a chat, join one, share an invite.
• CLI Reference — every talkrypt subcommand, flag, and in-chat /command.

Features

Area	Page	What's in it
🔐 Cryptography	Cryptography	ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA-87, AES-256-GCM, SHA3/KMAC, the Double Ratchet, KEM postures, self-tests, RAM-capture hardening
🪪 Identity	Identity & Accounts	ML-DSA identities, safety numbers, account→device→segment chains, device linking, username registries, contacts/friends
💬 Messaging	Messaging & Transport	invites/QR, P2P/Hub/Hybrid topologies, groups (TreeKEM), Tor/Arti + TCP, the wire format, replay/MITM defenses
🗝️ Key custody	Key Custody & Storage	custody tiers, at-rest sealing, hardware-backed sealing (StrongBox/Secure Enclave/TPM), the desktop helper
🏷️ Classification	Classification & Compliance	markings, CNSA 2.0, FIPS posture, CSfC alignment, the honesty posture
💻 Platforms	Platforms & Clients	CLI, TUI, the FFI, Android, iOS, the desktop helper, the roadmap
📦 Packaging	Packaging & Release	build scripts, every artifact, dual SHA-256 + SHA3-256 hashing, the verifiers
🛡️ Assurance	Security Assurance	the self-audit (F-1…F-15 / R-1…R-8), fuzzing, Miri, dependency scanning, the threat model

In one paragraph

You create a chat and get a talkrypt://… invite (also a QR). A peer joins with it; a one-time invite token + an out-of-band safety number defeat first-contact MITM. Every message is sealed with a Double Ratchet (per-message forward secrecy + post-compromise recovery) whose asymmetric step is a hybrid PQ KEM. Groups re-key per epoch with TreeKEM. Your long-term identity is an ML-DSA-87 key that certifies your devices; you can present it, stay pseudonymous, or rotate per conversation. It runs over a Tor onion service with restricted discovery, and your keys are held at the strongest custody tier your device offers.