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Classification & Compliance

What talkrypt aligns with — and, just as importantly, what it is not. Deep specs: docs/POSTURE.md, docs/COMPLIANCE.md, docs/CSFC.md. Source: crates/core/marking.rs, crates/core/csfc.rs, crates/crypto/suite.rs.

Classification markings

talkrypt can carry a per-channel classification marking (level + advisory SCI compartments + dissemination caveats, e.g. SECRET//SI//NOFORN):

  • Build-gated — originating a marking needs the --features markings build; reading a received marking always works (safety). Off in consumer builds.
  • Integrity-protected — the marking rides inside the AEAD-encrypted payload, so it's confidential and tamper-evident.
  • Advisory label, not a control — the marking never changes how strongly content is protected. The crypto is uniform and maximal for every level (CNSA 2.0 is single-tier: ML-KEM-1024 / ML-DSA-87 / AES-256 are approved up to TOP SECRET). Actual compartment access is enforced by TreeKEM group membership — who holds the group key — not by the label.

CNSA 2.0

talkrypt implements the NSA CNSA 2.0 algorithm set (see the algorithms). The suite registry enforces the parameter floor in code, against declared parameters (not a self-declared tag), and the AEAD key type structurally bars sub-256-bit keys (docs/COMPLIANCE.md, SECURITY-AUDIT.md F-11). The default hash is SHA3-384/KMAC256 (FIPS 202); --features cnsa-sha2 switches to the CNSA-named SHA-384/HKDF.

FIPS posture

  • A FIPS 140-3 gap self-assessment maps 11 areas (docs/COMPLIANCE.md): done — power-on self-tests + CAVP-traceable KATs, fuzzing/Kani, timing review, zeroization, dependency scanning; open — an approved DRBG wrapper, a formal module boundary + Security Policy, empirical side-channel testing.
  • --features fips routes AES-256-GCM + SHA-2 through aws-lc-rs (a CMVP-validated module). The binary is not itself a validated module — the validation belongs to the vendor — and ML-KEM/ML-DSA remain RustCrypto.

CSfC

talkrypt is architecture-aligned with CSfC's layered model: an inner E2E PQ layer (the Double Ratchet) inside an outer Tor onion layer — independent implementations, independent key hierarchies, each layer individually sufficient. talkrypt csfc prints a preflight checklist and enumerates the organizational requirements it cannot verify (Trusted Integrator, NSA registration, Components-List listing). See docs/CSFC.md.

The honesty posture

talkrypt is experimental, pre-release software: NOT independently audited, NOT FIPS-validated, NOT CSfC-accredited, NOT NSA-approved, NOT authorized for classified use. Implementing the CNSA 2.0 algorithms is not certification. Every package and the version banner repeat this. The dominant risk is the absence of independent review — see Security Assurance.